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Abstract 
The paper argues that the European financial system in the years following the great 
financial crisis started in 2007 has become increasingly fragile. Minsky’s notion of fragility, 
on which it is based,  is related to history, policy and institutions. In the current European 
environment, fragility depends on the rise of shadow banks’ assets, the expansion of 
derivatives and the changes in   financial regulation.  All these elements have jointly 
triggered several feedback loops. In Minsky’s opinion, policies should have the scope of 
thwarting  self-enforcing feedback loops. Yet the policies that have been implemented so 
far seem to have produced the opposite effects. They have created new feedback loops 
that nurture fragility again. This outcome, however, is not surprising for policies  may 
change initial conditions and  have unintended consequences, as Minsky has taught us 
since a long time. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The paper argues that the European financial system in the years following the great 
financial crisis started in 2007 has become increasingly fragile. The reasons that have led 
to that situation are different from those commonly mentioned as causes of the big crisis 
itself; they are grounded in the in the evolution of the system after the crisis and 
intertwined with the interventions aimed at improving financial stability. The notion of 
fragility used throughout the paper is linked to Minsky’s, so is multifaceted. He asserted 
that fragility has systemic properties. Therefore, to establish how fragile a financial system 
is, it is necessary to study the evolution of  both its structure and its institutions. Studying 
fragility requires looking at several dimensions; relying on simple metrics like the ratios of 
debt to equity and debt to total assets  may be misleading. 
 The financial system before the  crisis did not show any sign of a qualitative 
transformation towards a more  unstable structure except for its international expansion. 
Firms and households had not changed their financing patterns  and the pace of financial 
innovation was quite moderate in comparison to other areas of the world. The weight of 
shadow bank assets over total financial assets was negligible except for some particular 
countries like the UK and Luxenbourg and even derivatives trading volume was not high. 
This notwithstanding, the European financial system was severely hit by the global 
financial crisis as the data on the cost of bank restructuring show.  Now we have entered 
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in a phase called of deleveraging. Banks are engaged in shedding away assets and are  
shrinking. This is seen in the data on deleveraging. That deleveraging has mainly 
consisted of shedding cross border assets. In the last year cross border flows have fallen 
by many hundreds of billions dollars. Thus, since both the size of the banking system and 
its spatial interconnections have declined, the financial system should have become more 
resilient to crises. However, some troubling signs of   increased fragility in the financial 
structure have recently emerged.  The assets of the shadow banks  have increased in 
comparison to the pre-financial crisis period, derivatives  have been traded in new 
platforms,  and new derivatives products have been launched. Probably, an incentive to all 
this has come from changes in regulation either implemented or announced, such as 
Basel III capital charges, the lack of  restriction to proprietary trading, consolidation rules 
that differ across jurisdictions. 
The structure of the paper is the following. The first  section deals with the definition  of 
financial fragility in  Minsky, the second  describes the state of the financial system in 
Europe before the global financial crisis and  the third its evolution after the GFC. The 
fourth section explains why  financial fragility has been rising in Europe during  the current 
crisis until now; it argues that the interplay among shadow banking, derivatives expansion 
and  regulation  has created various feedback loops. The changes in policy that have been 
realized or announced have nurtured those feedback loops thus missing the main goal of  
thwarting the forces that lead away from equilibrium. In Minsky’s view, as we shall see, 
policy should act as a thwarting force that hinders the explosion of the system. In the  
language of cybernetics,  policy should reset the system.  The conclusions will follow. 
 
 
2 Financial fragility and financial structure in  Minsky. 
 
Minsky’s starting point is the instability of the economic system. In particular, he asks 
within which range of values or within which interval one can be confident that the system 
will go back to the original or the new equilibrium position after a disturbance. As Vercelli 
(2001) has noticed, this notion of stability is not simply dynamic but structural.1 This means 
that parameters matter and  if parameters tend to increase or decrease excessively the 
return to equilibrium never happens. This is also clear in the following sentence: 
 
“We are discussing a system that is not globally stable. The economy is best analysed by assuming 
that exist more than one stable equilibrium for the system. We are interested in the determinants of 
the domain of stability around the various stable equilibriums. Our questions are of the form. What is 
the maximum displacement that can take place and still have the system return to a particular initial 
equilibrium point’ and “ Upon what does this maximum displacement depend?” (Minsky 1982 p.143) 
 
The maximum displacement depends indeed upon the financial structure and linkages 
between the financial structure and real income (see Minsky 1982, p.143).  Therefore, a 
certain type of financial structure may be responsible for the instability of the system. In 
fact he adds, “For not unusual events to trigger the unusual, the financial environment 
within which the potential triggering event occurs must have a sufficiently small domain of 
                                                 
1
 Vercelli (2001) defines dynamic and structural instability (see also Tropeano 2010). Dynamic instability 
means that a system, after a disturbance, which will bring it beyond its equilibrium position, will tend either to 
go back to the initial point again or to reach another equilibrium configuration. Structural instability means 
that a small disturbance, even a very small one, may change the qualitative characteristics of  the system’s 
dynamic behavior (see Vercelli 2001). 
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stability.” The main determinants  of the domain of stability are, according to Minsky,  the 
extent to which a close articulation exists between the contractual and the customary cash 
flows from a unit and its various cash receipts and the weight in portfolio of those assets 
that in almost all circumstances can be sold at their book or face value.  
He defined  two aspects of the financial turmoil, the first is  microeconomic and the second 
is, macroeconomic. Answers must be given to the questions: “how units get in distress ? “ 
and  “how the problems of single economic units trigger a system wide crisis?”. He does 
not believe that  macroeconomic entities are made up of a collection of microeconomic 
units. Therefore, it is not possible to find solutions for aggregate disturbances by 
addressing the problems of  the single units in distress. The reason is that  financial 
instability is  a system characteristic.  
 
“Financial instability as a system characteristic  is compounded of two elements. How are units placed 
in financial distress and how does unit distress escalate into a system wide crisis?” ( Minsky, 1982, 
p.145) 
 
 In trying to explain the systemic element of the crisis, Minsky stresses the importance of 
the layering of financial relations: 
 
“The layering of financial interrelations affects the total payments that must be made. To the extent 
that layering increases at a faster rate than income, over a prolonged boom, the payments/income 
ratio will rise. The closer the articulation by consumers and business firms of income receipts  with 
payments due to financial contracts, the greater the potential for a financial crisis.” 
“Each money payment is a money receipt. As layering increases, the importance of the uninterrupted 
flow of receipts increases. The inability of one unit to meet its payment commitments affects the ability 
of the would-be recipient unit to meet its payment commitments.” (Minsky, 1982,p.147.) 
 
Minsky asserts that, in order to foresee the consequences of monetary policy, a good 
knowledge of   the financial structure is required. However, after certain monetary 
measures have been implemented, it is likely that the financial structure itself changes; in 
fact,  banks behave as any business enterprises and try to exploit  the new profit 
opportunities that arise after the change in policy. In that way the effects of the measures 
that were thought under the assumption of an existing financial structure may be different 
from those previously foreseen.  An example for this is the reaction of banks to the attempt 
by the Fed to contract the supply of credit by raising interest rates. He  warned then of the 
danger linked to the evolution of the non-banking sector and of the problems that this 
could pose to the working of monetary policy.  
 
“Hence the efficacy of any particular technique of monetary policy depends on the financial institutions 
and usages that exist. If financial institutions do not change significantly, then, once the efficacy of the 
various central bank operations is established, financial institutions can be ignored in discussions of 
monetary policy. However, if a period of rapid changes in the structure or in the mode of functioning of 
financial markets occurs, then the efficacy of central bank actions has to be re-examined.”(Minsky, 
1982, p. 162) 
 
Minsky also discusses the difference between changes in legislation and changes in the 
evolution of usages in the money market: 
 
“Changes in financial institutions and money-market usages are the result of either legislation or 
evolution. Legislated changes typically are the result of some real or imagined malfunctioning of the 
monetary-financial system and hence they  usually are  accompanied by discussions of their impact. 
Evolutionary changes occur typically in response to some profit possibilities, which exist in the money 
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market. As the evolved changes often center around some technical detail  of the money-market 
behaviour and as they usually start on a small scale, their significance for monetary policy is generally 
ignored at the time  they first occur. Only if, at a later date, some malfunctioning of the financial system 
is imputed to such an evolved  money-market institution, will it be discussed, and then the discussion 
usually occurs as a prelude to corrective legislation.” (Minsky 1982, p.162-3) 
 
The instability of the system is linked to parameters shifts that depend on institutional 
evolution. 
 
“Essentially, the relations upon which the monetary authorities base their operations are predicated 
upon the assumption that a given set of institutions and usages exists. If the operations of the 
authorities have side effects in that they induce changes in financial institutions and usages, then the 
relations  “shift”.  As a result, the effects of monetary policy can be very different from those desired.” 
(Minsky 1982, p.163) 
 
The point raised in the last quotation has been further developed in another paper (see 
Ferri and Minsky 1991). They argued that the economic system, if left to market forces, 
would experience an endogenous tendency towards instability.  If everyone acts in his /her 
own interest,  it will not  bring  the economy as a whole to its  optimum position. The  
pursuit of  maximum profit by each agent will lead to macroeconomic instability. They claim 
to have discovered an Anti-Laisser Faire theorem. Economic policy has to put ceilings and 
floors to the economic fluctuations that occur because of individualistic profit-seeking 
behaviour.  
Economic policy may be any type of policy rather than just the monetary or fiscal policies 
of the neoclassical synthesis. However, the inclusion of economic policy into the picture is 
not mechanical. They warned  that economic policy depends upon the environment in 
which is implemented and upon the economic agents’ reactions to it. Policies that in the 
past  have thwarted the instability properties of the laisser faire system could lose their 
beneficial role after a while if, in the meantime, circumstances have changed. Examples 
taken from different scenarios are used to  corroborate that thesis. 
 
“The thwarting forces change in time. They differ among economic systems. The thwarting systems 
are analogous to homeostatic mechanisms which may prevent a system from exploding. However, 
they are not mechanical. Policy makers and law makers need to interpret what is happening and need 
to understand  how their actions can  affect the behaviour of endogenous agents and thus the 
economy.” (Ferri and Minsky 1991 p.12) 
 
The thwarting mechanisms that are listed and used as examples are the Piore-Sabel 
conjecture with respect to labour markets in the Us in the post war period, the uses of 
market power, and  lender of last resort interventions by the central bank. 
In this paper,  these  insights by Minsky will be applied to the present situation of the 
European financial system. While shadow banking in Europe before the global financial 
crisis was limited to the offshore and cross border activities of European banks,  in the 
meantime, after the global financial crisis, the measures intended to make the system 
more stable have themselves caused  a transformation   that might increase the financial 
fragility. This has happened  because of the tighter inter-relations between units due to  
the increased weight of derivatives-linked contracts. I am also arguing that in the new 
environment, traditional monetary policy measures may have counterintuitive effects. 
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3 Evolution of the financial structure in the European Union before the global 
financial crisis. 
 
The purpose of this section is to give a hint at how the European financial system has 
evolved  before the global financial crisis. Scholarly debates on bank versus market based 
financial systems are focussed on whether the US system could  still be described as a  
market based system and how it has changed in the last decade. Similarly, it could be 
asked whether the European financial system is still a  bank-based system.   Schmidt, 
Hackethal, Tyrell,  (1999) have shown,  that the financial systems of  Great Britain, France 
and Germany  had become less bank based than in the past. This phenomenon, however, 
took different shapes in each country. They have observed that  French and German 
banks were increasingly disintermediated on the side of their liabilities; in fact, an 
increasing share of  non-financial sectors assets was no more held as deposits in banks.  
Yet these financial systems were not moving towards a model, in which the capital market 
is as important as in Anglo-Saxon countries; what has happened is just that the role of 
banks as mobilizers of deposits has declined. On the liabilities side of their balance sheets  
the banks have increasingly more  securities and other assets that must be sold on the 
market. Thus, they do depend on market conditions to finance themselves. This is more 
evident for the French financial system than for the German one. The disintermediation of 
banks goes hand in hand with the securitization process. Further, they observe that banks 
derive a greater part of their income from  trading activities rather than from the margin of 
intermediation. 
The US financial system too has passed through various stages of transformation in the 
last two decades. Banks have been heavily disintermediated on the side of both assets 
and liabilities. Many new non-bank financial institutions have arisen whose share of assets 
over the total has been continuously increasing. They were offering different products but 
had  as common feature the need for financing themselves on the market, often through 
the issue of short term paper (See Poznar et al. 2010). Non-financial corporations  have 
become net creditors rather than debtors, so they do not issue securities in the market  
any more to finance themselves. The same stock exchange has declined in importance as 
most exchanges are not carried out any more in public markets. Investors are increasingly 
channelling their funds to enterprises through hedge funds, mutual funds, private equity 
funds and the majority of these new institutions do not pass through the stock exchange. 
The European financial system then may be converging towards the most recent version 
of the Anglo-Saxon system rather than towards its classic model. 
This notwithstanding, it is difficult to deny that banks in Europe  are still the most important 
actors in the financial system. This is confirmed by the most recent data by the ECB report 
on Banking structures on the assets of banks relatively to those of non-bank financial 
institutions and  by the ratio of bank assets to the gross domestic product of the euro area. 
Their assets on average are 75% of  financial institutions assets’ of the Eurozone. The 
corresponding figure for US banks in 2008 is 25% (see Nersiyasan and Wray 2010, Figure 
3, p.8). The importance of banks is also witnessed by the growing ratio of their assets to 
gross domestic product in the euro area and in the European Union. 
Table 1 below shows data on the debt of the main institutional sectors, households, the 
state, non-financial corporations  respectively In the E.U. and in the U.S.. 
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Table 1: Assets and liabilities of   non-financial corporations and households in the US and 
in Eu. 
 
Institutional 
sector 
assets liabilities 
Households EU Assets/households 
gross disposable 
income 
299.8 
Debt/gross 
disposable 
income 
97.4 
Nonfinancial 
corporations EU 
Assets/GDP 
182.9 
Debt/GDP 
118.3 
State  EU  Debt/GDP 
79.1 
 Households US Assets/households 
gross disposable 
income 
 
399.9 
Debt/gross 
disposable 
income 
 
122.9 
Nonfancial 
corporations US 
Assets/GDP 
 
118.3 
Debt/GDP 
 
77.2 
State  US  Debt/GDP 
 68.6 
 
Source: Ecb Economics Statistics Pocket  April 2011 (the data in the table are those of 
2009). 
 
We see that the ratio of the debt of non-financial corporations to GDP  in the euro area is 
higher than that of  U.S. non financial corporations. The same holds for the ratio of the 
assets of non financial corporations to gap. The net  worth, that is the balance between 
assets and liabilities, is higher too. This however, does not justify any optimism on the 
financial health of the European business sector, as growing net worth may be compatible 
with growing financial fragility in presence of capital asset inflation (see Tymoigne 2011).  
The high indebtedness of households and firms  confirms the  growing relevance of banks 
in the financial system since most  of these liabilities of the private sector are held towards 
banks. The banks so have increased their claims on  the private sector.  On other hand, 
also non financial corporations have continued to accumulate  both liabilities and assets. 
Their dependence on banks for the financing of accumulation has not ceased. They have 
just raised much more funds than those needed to finance a very modest accumulation 
rate (investment is just 10% of gdp). The most probable thing is that they have raised 
loans to finance speculative asset purchases profiting from the increasing stock prices in 
the years before the financial crisis. In fact, both their asset and liabilities holdings show a 
marked increase in the period 2005-2007. Hartmann, Maddaloni and Manganelli (2003) 
argue  that in terms of non financial corporations financing there has  been no structural 
break with the past (see Hartmann et al. p.14). The same seems to hold at the time of 
writing too. The main break with the past is the extent to which those assets and liabilities 
are being  accumulated  beyond the  amount  needed to finance real investment.  
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So far, it does not seem that the financial system in Europe has changed a lot except for 
the  unprecedented expansion of  the assets of banks with respect to gdp and  of  the 
debts of  households and non financial corporations. The only feature of the current 
evolution of banks that could  justify the claim of a convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon 
type of financial system is the growing ratio of securities over total  liabilities in their 
balance sheets. This is reflected in their growing use of market instruments to finance 
themselves particularly the issue of bonds. This tendency, however,  does not occur with 
the same strength in all countries.  (see Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrell 1999, Hartmann, 
Manganelli and Maddaloni 2003). There has been also an increase in interbank cross 
border loans. Most banks in core countries have lent to banks in peripheral countries.  
 
 
4 The evolution of the European financial system through  the global financial crisis. 
 
The European banking system contributed through its shadow banks, special investment 
vehicles and the like, to the  credit intermediation process in the U.S.. As scholars of 
shadow banking in the U.S.  have explained, this section of the financial sector actually 
fulfils the same functions  as the banking system, as it  performs maturity, credit and 
liquidity transformations. The shadow banks linked to European institutions were 
contributing to the supply of credit in the U.S. by  raising short-term money in dollar and 
them investing it in the purchase of all products linked to the securitization of mortgages. 
The burst of the bubble in the U.S. meant that they have to repay their loans and could not 
sell their assets because the markets had disappeared. They needed to repay debts 
denominated in dollars and thus the dollar shortage emerged. The problem with dollars 
was solved by the intervention of the Federal Reserve, which was channelling to Europe 
though the ECB about seventy billions of dollars in 2008-09. Thus, the  European shadow 
banking contributed to the excessive  credit expansion in the US; In Europe too n some 
countries the rate of growth of credit was excessive, for example in Spain and Ireland, but 
credit intermediation was conducted along traditional methods. The shadow banking in the 
US contributed to the expansion of the credit supply in Europe too in so far money market 
mutual funds  purchased bonds issued by  European banks.  Both these links were being 
cut in the period after the  great financial crisis. This is witnessed by the official figures on 
the fall in foreign banks assets in the Us.  Shadow banking and all the activities associated 
to it has not been  very important for credit intermediation in Europe. That notwithstanding 
the big financial crisis  hit heavily the European banking system because of  its 
international expansion. The volumes of securitized assets and derivatives traded in the 
European markets were quite limited before the global financial crisis. After the global 
financial crisis and  the deleveraging by European banks (see Bis 2012, Molleker 2012)  
shadow banks’  assets have increased relatively to those of banks  (see FSB 2012 Exhibit 
2-4 p.15).  In the US, instead,  the growth of shadow banking  stems from  the competition 
between banks and non-banks  on both  the liabilities and the assets side. Banks suffered 
from the competition by non-banks because the latter were allowed to offer higher interest 
rates on deposits-like assets. Banks were obliged by regulation q to offer fixed low interest 
rates on deposits ( see Rezende 2011, Kregel 2010). Thus in order to help them compete 
they were allowed to develop new products,  mainly securities, on which regulation q did 
not apply, and then slowly the Glass-Steagall Act was abolished.  In Europe, there has 
been competition between banks and non-banks on the liabilities side but not on the 
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assets side. 2 In this regard, we cannot assume  that shadow banking has had an active 
role in the credit intermediation process neither in the past nor in the present. The 
definition of shadow banking  Pozsar et al. (2010) have used does not fit well in the 
European environment.3 Thus, banks did not enter into  shadow  activities because  
suffered from an increased competition in the domestic loans market.  They just wished to 
increase their return on equity, to  distribute higher dividends and to pay higher  bonuses 
to managers.   Shadow banking in Europe  arises from the imitation of an Us style of  
capitalism, there is no endogenous evolution of the  market on the demand side. No big 
change in the demand for loans has happened anywhere. There has been a fall in the 
demand for deposits everywhere but with different intensity. It is however doubtful whether 
this fall could be related to a change in tastes and preferences by final consumers. Often, 
they did not decide freely to demand certain financial assets that replaced deposits; they 
were compelled to do so  by  pensions and health care entitlements  reforms.  This  is no 
spontaneous evolution of the market on the demand side but it is the result of political 
decisions.4  
 
5 The increase in fragility due to closer inter-relations: the role of shadow banking, 
derivatives and regulation. 
The purpose of this section is explaining  how the financial fragility has increased  despite 
the fact that the indebtedness of individual financial institutions has decreased.5 The 
fragility of the financial system, as defined by Minsky (see section 1), may either increase 
or decrease when its size is reduced. Financial fragility for Minsky has to be measured with 
                                                 
2
 There has been a proposal to split the financial system in two parts. The first would  consist of  narrow 
banks  that would have only safe assets on their balance sheets and would enjoy both liquidity and solvency 
support  by the state, the second of lending institutions that would finance themselves on the market without 
any state backing  (see Kregel 2010). If that proposal were realized, a line would be traced between 
institutions that accept deposits but do not lend and institutions that do lend but are not allowed to accept 
deposits. This separation would not fit well in with  the historical development of  European banking.  Banks 
in Europe have never given up the lending neither have  they been challenged in this task by strong 
competitors.  
3
 Poszar et al. (2010) argue that shadow banks fulfill the same functions as banks,  despite not having 
access to the liquidity provided by the central bank.  They  perform maturity, credit and liquidity 
transformations. In the U.S., shadow banks were financing themselves in the wholesale market by issuing  
short-term debt and then were buying long-term assets such as securitized mortgages. In Europe, even if, in 
some countries there was  an excessive expansion of mortgage or consumer debt , it was just  an excessive 
expansion of traditional bank credit. Corporations and small firms were still relying on bank debt to finance 
both their capital investment and their acquisitions of financial assets. The  discussion on the difficulty of 
coming back to Glass-Steagall because   going back would mean depriving the banks of profits and making 
them less competitive with respect to the rest of the system does not apply to Europe. In some countries, the 
separation between retail and investment banking   has never been realized ( see the case of Germany). In 
other countries,  banks have learnt to profit from securities trading by selling  investment fund shares and  
pension funds products to their depositors (see the case of  Italy).  
4Mehrling’s definition of  shadow banking activity as “acquisition of capital market assets financed through 
money market funding”  does not apply to the European banks that  use money market funding to finance 
loans. It applies instead to their trading desks activities  and in particular to the activity of their foreign 
subsidiaries and branches.  
5
 There is a wide recognition of  the process of deleveraging occurring  in the European banking system, see 
The Economist 2012, Puhr et al.2012. 
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flow variables rather than stocks. This point was emphasized by Tymoigne (2011) and 
Dymski (2010)6.  
In fact, the process of debt reduction was associated with increased layering due to the 
greater weight of derivatives in the portfolios (see Mediobanca  2012). The range of 
stability of the financial system, as defined by Minsky, has narrowed. The connection 
between cash flows in and out is so increased. The growing use of derivatives by the 
European financial institutions has several causes. Among these are the volatility in the 
financial markets following the crisis of sovereign debt, uncertainty, changes in financial 
regulation (see Alloway  2012 , Murphy 2012 , Pollack 2012  and Tropeano 2011). 
Changes in financial regulation, executed or only announced, contributed to the 
development of some feedback mechanisms that once triggered automatically loop. The 
new version of the regulation of capital requirements for banks prepared by the  Basel 
Committee and commonly known as Basel III  still encourages the use of derivatives as a 
means to save capital. If the banks that have risky assets in their portfolio buy a credit 
default swap, they are compensated with discounts on regulatory capital. The increase in 
demand for protection has been followed by a corresponding increase in the supply of new 
products in the European financial markets that securitize existing loans  of any issuer  by 
using the same packaging method  that was used in the U.S. to securitize  housing loans.  
Further  financial institutions have shown their interest  to enlarge their derivatives trading 
platforms and to open new ones. The derivatives market Eurex managed by the Deutsche 
Börse has become the second biggest market in the world only slightly smaller than the 
one managed by the  New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The attempt by Deutsche Börse 
to buy the NYSE in order to build up the biggest derivatives market in the world has been 
stopped by the European authorities because it would have created a huge monopoly in 
that trading activity.  This increase in the volume of trading has induced an   U.S. institution 
leader in derivatives trading, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME, to make plans to 
expand into the London financial centre (see Il Sole 24 Ore , 2012).  
Several feedback mechanisms are at work. The simplest has at its center the uncertainty. 
This mechanism has been unraveled in particular in the market for public debt.  The 
increased demand for protection against default causes an increase in its price, the credit 
default premium. As this is seen  as a sign of  increased probability of default, the price of 
bonds falls and their yield  rises.  Uncertainty makes profitable speculative activities. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that all operators use models that define risk as depending upon 
volatility. If volatility rises,  speculation is more profitable and the demand for protection 
rises too  in a self-enforcing loop.  In the market for sovereign bonds in the Eurozone such 
a feedback was based on the positive differential between CDS premium and bond yields 
spreads  of the peripheral Eurozone countries bonds. Many empirical studies have found 
that the CDS premium increases first and the bond yield follows (see f.e. Coudert V. and 
Gex M. 2010, Arce, Ó., Mayordomo, S. and Peña, J. I., 2012). Coudert and Gex (2010) 
argue that, undoubtedly, the CDS premium leads the bond yield in the case of Southern 
European bonds markets while the same does not hold for core European countries low 
yield  public bonds. Their interpretation of these findings is that the price discovery process 
in the market for Southern European bonds happens in the CDS market while in the core 
European countries it happens in the spot market. That  Cds market leads the bonds 
market in a section of countries – the authors write --   is  puzzling  because the latter is 
                                                 
6
 Dymski (2010) writes: “What remains invisible in Minsky’s rendition of his model is his assumption that loan 
commitments become unsustainable because they generate negative cash-flows (they represent  Ponzi 
finance, in his terminology), not because of the insolvency of the units involved.” p.240. 
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much less liquid than the former. They had found the opposite in the Cds spread with 
respect to the bond spread in the market for corporate bonds and had justified that result 
with the observation that the cds market  is more liquid than the  bonds market. 
If the feedback loop explanation matters, then it does not make sense to speak of price 
discovery process by the market for CDS. The cds market is not discovering earlier than 
the spot market  the right price based on fundamentals but it is making it. The spot market 
will follow. Once the high yield on bonds has  worsened the macroeconomic situation in 
southern countries, then  fundamentals will adapt themselves to the new, previously 
determined in derivatives market, price. The process may take different routes. Surely, the 
increase in interest payments decreases domestic aggregate demand and gross national 
product thus increasing the debt to gdp ratio. Moreover, since bonds are used in repo 
funding between banks, the fall in the value of  repos will cause liquidity problems and 
probably credit contractions or higher interest rates for clients.    
 
 Table 2. Feedback loops 
 
 
 
difference between cds yields and bonds yields  (positive 
basis) 
 
 
 
market perceived uncertainty and the volatility of   
bond prices  
 
     
 
 
Increase in bond yields  (decrease in bond prices)        
 
value of repo collateral falls                  
 
                 
cost of short term borrowing in the interbank markets  
 
 
interest rate on loans                                 
credit supply may shrink 
 
 
 
In the European financial crisis,  the  public bonds of  peripheral states  used as collateral 
in repo transactions  have the same role as, in the Us crisis, the  ABS  used as  collateral  
in  repo. The fall in the value of  peripheral countries  state bonds has caused  the freezing 
of the European interbank market just as the  distrust towards toxic bonds had caused the 
freezing of the U.S. market for short-term borrowing among financial institutions. The 
Federal Reserve, however,  has  bought  the  assets that were no more accepted as 
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collateral and swapped them  with safe Treasuries by introducing   new facilities directed 
to the shadow banks.  On the contrary, the ECB was not allowed to buy  public bonds in 
the primary market and has bought them in the secondary market only  intermittently  in 
the middle of  a debate  on whether this policy  should be continued. Thus, the ECB has 
not succeeded so far in easing the safe collateral problem.  
Another feedback loop is created by the interaction between the demand for IRS (interest  
rate swaps) and the demand for CDS (credit default swaps). This feedback loop is an 
example of how the expansion of the derivatives and the change in the regulation interact 
in increasing financial layering. There is a rule that obliges  institutions that deal with 
derivatives to protect themselves with CDS when the counterparty does not post collateral 
(see Murphy 2012). So all derivatives trades involving sovereigns as counterparty 
automatically make  the  demand for CDS increase.  Interest rate swaps by used by public 
debt management agencies for various reasons.7  If the sovereigns do not post collateral, 
as is usual, their  counterparties must hedge their positions by buying CDS, which in turn 
increases the premium on the CDS and via the uncertainty channel increases the bond 
rate too. On the other hand, if bond yield volatility increases, then the people will be more 
inclined to use the derivatives market for  protection and so the demand for IRS rises 
again. The rising demand for CDS makes the demand for IRS increase and then the circle 
repeats itself without resting. To the extent that the markets for IRS and CDS have 
increased their traded volumes, 8 it is logical to argue that  layering and  
interconnectedness have increased.  
Another channel, through which the use of derivatives may contribute to fragility, is through 
liquidity problems  on the balance sheets of financial institutions. Higher collateral charges, 
due to changes in the market valuation of derivatives, can cause unexpected outflows and 
turn speculative units into Ponzi. Changes in the valuations of  derivatives  may cause, in a 
mark to market to the market environment,  liquidity pressures and in some case initiate a 
spreading of sales to  get liquidity. Thus,  the ratio of  expected inflows to expected 
outflows may be heavily affected by the composition of the balance sheets. That regulation 
has also contributed  to  the safe collateral crunch and  has made the yield of  good  
collateral plunge to negative values in real terms. The specular side of that  is the higher  
yield of the collateral considered unsafe. If this distinction is based on country risk rather 
than individual institutions’ solvency estimates this means an enormous increase in the 
cost of financing and decrease in the availability of  credit to  firms and banks of  the 
countries  considered less safe. 
 Changes in the value of derivatives, due to mark-to-the-market accounting,  may act in the 
same way as interest changes in Minsky’s original formulation of the financial fragility 
hypothesis. Outflows may rise not only because a higher  interest on debt is to be paid, but 
also because of  changes in the valuation of assets or in the liquidity requirements of  
holding certain types of assets. The  Basel III  draft introduces two metrics linked to 
liquidity,  the liquidity coverage ratio LCR,  and the stable funding ratio SFR (see Tropeano 
2011). Some  recent episodes of financial distress confirm the view that the changes in the 
valuation of derivatives may cause serious liquidity problems to banks. For example, a too 
                                                 
7
 According to Piga (2001),  public debt managers  have used interest rate swaps  as a means  to save 
interest costs  and to change the duration of their portfolio.  For example, they would prefer to issue long-
term bonds  and then  use the swap to pay  the short-term interest rate on them rather than the long-term 
interest on the bonds. He argues that  public debt managers in most cases were variable rate payers in the 
swaps.  He further  warns that, by  entering into the swaps, they have become  exposed to both credit and 
counterparty risk.  
8
 For the data see Bank for International Settlements , 2012. 
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big to fail bank, Dexia,  has been jointly saved  for the second time in three years  by the 
government of France,  Belgium and Luxenbourg because of  the losses in its portfolio of 
sovereign bonds reinforced rather than mitigated by its derivative positions. Dexia was 
losing both on the bonds portfolio and on the interest swap position allegedly built to 
protect the same portfolio  9: 
 
“Dexia's derivative positions put even more pressure on short-term funding. Dexia was long fixed rate 
assets and hedged its positions using interest rate swaps. Between June and September 2011, Dexia 
had to post EUR 15 billion cash collateral due the fall in interest rates.” (Acharya and Steffen 2012, 
p.17) 
 
 Acharyia and Steffen (2012) argue that the case of Dexia is not an isolated phenomenon. 
Many European banks, they write, would have  used the same carry trade in governments 
bonds to boost  profits and similarly incurred in losses on their derivatives positions and in 
the necessity to restore impaired capital.10 This point is confirmed by recent events. The 
fall in the Euribor rate during the year 2012 would have caused a worsening of  the  
already low profitability of  MPS bank’s trading book, according to an interview given by its 
CEO to an Italian newspaper  (see Greco 2013). 
In the case of  Dexia and Monte dei Paschi, the fall in the value of  interest rate swaps for 
the buyers   has caused  liquidity pressures on banks’ balance sheets, has made  capital 
scarce  and  may have contributed to the credit crunch. In particular,  lower interest rates 
may cause  problems to  financial firms that have on their balance sheets a high share of  
interest rate swaps and that pay fixed, being  the fixed leg of the swap much higher than 
the current interest rate. In that case, losses in the valuation of  derivatives could increase 
the need for capital. This would be particularly worrying for European periphery banking 
institutions that in any case would require more capital to write off  bad loans. The 
percentage of bad loans in the periphery has greatly increased because of the fiscal 
retrenchment and its repercussions through the multiplier on aggregate demand. 
Thus, the effects of  economic policy, as Minsky repeatedly asserted,  heavily depend on 
the structure of the financial system. Assume, for example, that  many economic units in 
the financial system have a high share of interest rate swaps in their portfolio and are the 
fixed rate payers. In that case, a fall  in the interest rate (f.e. Euribor) on which the floating 
rate payment is based would inflict a loss to their derivatives position  without any 
improvement in the bonds portfolio.  In such an environment, a lower interest rate could 
trigger a liquidity shortfall and cause a debt deflation process,  if  no other policy measures  
had been taken.  In the current European crisis the European Central Bank has introduced 
                                                 
9
 A fixed interest swap in its simplest form may be used to protect the value of a bond portfolio.  In that case, 
the investor that is long on the bonds  is supposed to buy an interest rate swap and to pay a fixed rate while 
the  counterparty to the deal, the seller of the swap, will commit itself to paying a floating rate. The floating 
rate is  linked to a benchmark interest rate, which for European interest rate swaps with long maturity is 
normally the Euribor rate, a rate charged on interbank unsecured loans among  44 European banks. The 
value of the swap for the buyer is inversely related to the interest rate while the opposite holds for the seller. 
From what is  known for Dexia  its losses  were due to both  a fall in the value of  European states bonds and 
a fall in the value of the swap; the former  was due to the increasing  perceived risk  of default of the issuing 
states and the latter was due  to the fall in the Euribor interest rate. A lower interest rate may have 
unforeseen effects in a financial structure, in which derivatives constitute a large part of  financial institutions’ 
portfolios.  A lower  interest rate  may  cause  liquidity problems.  
10
 Both Dexia and Mps would be considered   shadow banks if we adopt  Mehrling’s definition (see Mehrling 
2013).  The reason is that they  used short-term money market funding to finance the acquisition of assets in 
the capital market, namely long maturity public bonds, profiting from the difference between the cost of repo 
(haircut) and the yield on bonds. 
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a new facility at the  end of 2011, called LTRO, long term   refinancing operation. This 
facility  has mitigated the banks’ liquidity problem by allowing them to borrow long term 
from the central bank against  any type of collateral. Yet, the fiscal austerity  policy, either 
imposed or voluntary, has opened another hole in their balance sheet due to higher 
provisions for  bad loans. This in turn has made capital scarce. Then they have had to 
save capital (either through securitization or the use of derivatives) or alternatively to raise 
it in the middle of  a bearish market. If both these routes were not feasible, the only way 
left would be cutting credit. Many banks have in fact chosen the latter alternative as  the 
data on  the negative rate of growth of the credit supply in the Eurozone show.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Has the financial fragility in the European financial system increased after the Great 
financial crisis? This paper has answered that indeed it has. A further question has been 
why fragility has increased. 
The answer to that second question has been given by looking at how Minsky defined 
fragility. The most important part of its theory has been the systemic nature of fragility and 
its link to interconnectedness.  Fragility is also  linked to evolution, history and policy. 
 The financial system has still remained a bank-based system as far as banks retain a 
dominant position with respect to other financial intermediaries. The European banks had 
contributed to the big financial crisis through the operations of their affiliates and 
subsidiaries abroad. Thus, they were involved in the crisis because of their international 
expansion. The more recent problems however go beyond that background. Fragility is 
now linked to the major use of old and new derivatives that depends on the imitation of  
the U.S. type of capitalism and on the incentives offered by  regulation. So European 
banks have increasingly started to behave as shadow banks, to borrow in wholesale 
money markets in order to finance the acquisition of capital market assets. This is done by 
big banks, while small and medium sized banks keep giving loans to households and 
firms. While, in the U.S., the orientation of  demand towards a certain type of products 
different from deposits may have fostered the rise of shadow banking, the same does not 
hold for Europe.  
The paper shows how, although indebtedness by banks has fallen, fragility has increased. 
The reasons lie in the interplay among  changes in markets and regulation that have 
triggered several self-enforcing feedback loops. The regulators seem to believe that their 
task is changing   capital weights to adjust for the new risks and  introducing  liquidity and 
collateral requirements.   However, if banks target a return on equity as higher as possible, 
imposing more capital and  collateral requirements on them  causes only liquidity 
problems.  A contraction in the credit supply to businesses may follow too. Their behavior 
is also justified by the certainty of  being rescued in case of problems.  As Minsky had 
warned, the pursuit of the maximum profit  in a competitive space does not ensure the 
optimum for the society as a whole but on the contrary unleashes destabilizing forces. 
 The paper gives  a few examples of  the feedback loops that have been unraveled. It 
shows that,  if  prices are made in derivatives market, their repercussions on fundamentals 
and the real economy may generate further instability in financial markets. This has 
happened in the market for public bonds issued by Southern European countries. It also 
argues that the growing use of derivatives tools both to speculate and to avoid uncertainty 
has made the balance sheets of financial institutions more vulnerable to liquidity stops. In 
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particular, the need to find cash to fulfill payment obligations arising from margin calls on 
either derivatives or repo agreements  is behind many recent episodes of  banking 
distress. 
Policies should have the scope of thwarting  naturally occurring self-enforcing feedback 
loops in Minsky’s opinion. Yet the policies that have been implemented after the great 
financial crisis seem to have produced the opposite effects. They have created new 
feedback loops that nurture fragility again. This outcome, however, is not surprising if, as 
Minsky did, we acknowledge that policy measures change initial conditions and may have 
unintended consequences. 
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